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I. Introduction
The ability of creditors to enforce fiduciary duties against directors
when a corporation enters the zone of insolvency has emerged in the last
decade as a major question in corporate governance scholarship and
practice. Since United States ("U.S.") case law remains largely
undeveloped in this area, an analysis of the approach to the agency cost
problem in the zone of insolvency in other major jurisdictions could
provide helpful guidance in shaping U.S. law. This article compares and
analyzes director duties and creditor protections when corporations enter
the zone of insolvency in the U.S., Germany, and Japan.
Conflicts of interest between creditors and shareholders intensify
once a corporation enters the zone of insolvency. With the depletion of
corporate assets, creditors begin to displace shareholders as residual
claimants on a firm's assets. However, since shareholders maintain
control rights prior to the institution of insolvency proceedings, the
agency cost problem of shareholder opportunism vis-A-vis creditors
intensifies during the zone of insolvency.
Although the need for law to provide creditors additional protection
is debatable, each comparative jurisdiction responds to this agency cost
problem by providing mechanisms of creditor protection. The U.S. and
Germany provide creditor protection through a combination of standards,
strategies, and increased creditor enforcement mechanisms. In contrast,
Japan provides creditor protection through corporate governance practice
that puts creditors at the helm of struggling firms. Relative to Germany
and Japan's response, the U.S.'s response best addresses this agency cost
problem by minimizing the conflict of interest between shareholders and
* J.D., 2006, Vanderbilt University Law School. The author would like to thank
Professor Randall Thomas for his assistance with this publication.
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creditors and allowing directors to maximize firm value.
Part II of this article discusses the agency cost problems prevalent in
the zone of insolvency. Parts III, IV, and V outline the responses to this
agency cost problem in the U.S., Germany, and Japan respectively. Part
VI analyzes the extent to which each country's response addresses these
agency cost problems. Finally, part VII concludes that the U.S. approach
best addresses these agency cost problems by giving managers the
flexibility to maximize firm value in the face of competing stakeholder
interests.
II. Agency Cost Problems in the Zone of Insolvency
A corporation's entrance into the zone of insolvency magnifies the
conflict of interest between shareholders and creditors. As insolvency
looms, competition for limited (and likely diminishing) corporate
resources intensifies between shareholders and creditors each seeking a
return on invested capital. As a result, the specter of shareholder
opportunism vis-A-vis creditors becomes an increasingly significant
agency cost for firms approaching insolvency. Moreover, this agency
cost is amplified because shareholders and creditors influence board
decision-making through different mechanisms,' have access to different
degrees of information about the company, and face collective action
problems.
Four specific conflicts of interest between shareholders and
creditors in the zone of insolvency magnify agency costs. 2  First,
shareholders and creditors have different risk preferences for
management's investment of corporate resources. Second, each party
may attempt to siphon out the firm's assets. Third, shareholders and
creditors may have divergent preferences regarding whether the company
should liquidate or continue operating as a going concern. Finally,
shareholders may have an incentive to under-invest corporate resources
when only creditors will benefit from the return on investment. The
remainder of this section discusses these conflicts of interest in greater
detail.
A. Divergent Risk Preferences
Shareholders and creditors diverge in their risk preferences
1. In this context, shareholders influence board decision-making primarily through
appointment and removal rights while creditors influence board decision-making
primarily through negotiation and the threat of instituting debt collection or insolvency
proceedings.
2. See Laura Lin, Shift of Fiduciary Duty Upon Corporate Insolvency: Proper
Scope ofDirectors' Duty to Creditors, 46 VAND. L. REv. 1485, 1489 (1993).
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regarding management investment of corporate resources when
companies experience financial distress. Shareholders, as residual
claimants of the corporation, fully benefit from management's
investment activity that increases the value of the firm. In contrast,
creditors, who typically hold fixed claims against corporate assets, do not
benefit from successful investment activity beyond the value of their
claims. Inside the zone of insolvency, this incentive structure creates a
preference for greater investment of corporate resources in shareholders
while creating a preference for minimal investment in other creditors.
Conversely, shareholders do not bear the full burden of unsuccessful
investment activity undertaken by the corporation. As the lowest priority
claimants, shareholders' expected return on equity diminishes as the
corporation approaches insolvency. Facing the prospect of a low-to-zero
return on equity, shareholders prefer that management gamble corporate
resources in high risk investments in hopes of high returns. In contrast,
creditors bear the full burden of a financially distressed company's poor
investment decisions. Assets that are invested unsuccessfully are no
longer available to satisfy creditors' claims. Thus, creditors have little to
gain if the corporation undertakes risky investments with assets that
could otherwise be used to satisfy their claims. Accordingly,
shareholders prefer risky corporate investments that carry the possibility
of large returns while creditors prefer low-risk investments to preserve
the assets available.
B. Incentives to Siphon Assets Out of the Firm
Shareholders and creditors both have strong incentives to siphon
assets out of the firm when the corporation enters the zone of insolvency.
In order to maximize their return on equity, shareholders may act
opportunistically by seeking payment of dividends or other distributions.
Additionally, controlling shareholders and insiders may attempt to
acquire corporate assets on favorable terms. Likewise, creditors will
seek to maximize the return on their claims by pursuing the remedies
provided by their lending contracts.5 Such contractual remedies include
the right to seize collateral that is subject to a security interest and the
right to accelerate debt repayment. In addition to placing shareholder
and creditor interests in direct conflict, this zero-sum race to siphon
assets out of the firm could prevent management from entering
investments that are beneficial to the company.6
3. See id. at 1489-90.
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C. Divergent Liquidation Preferences
When a corporation enters the zone of insolvency, shareholders and
creditors typically differ in the preference of whether to keep the
company in operation. Shareholders that will receive nothing upon the
liquidation of an insolvent company have a strong incentive to keep the
company operational as long as possible in the hope of turning things
around. On the other hand, creditors tend to prefer the prompt, certain
repayment available through liquidation over the uncertainty and risks
involved in keeping the company operational.7
D. Shareholders Incentives for Underinvestment
In a company approaching insolvency, shareholders have no
incentive for certain positive net present value investments when the
benefits solely accrue to creditors.8 To the extent that shareholders can
influence management investment decisions in the zone of insolvency,
they will discourage management from undertaking investments that will
not increase their return on equity. This could lead to socially
undesirable outcomes when management declines to invest in positive
net present value opportunities from which shareholders may not
benefit.9
III. U.S. Response to this Agency Cost Problem
A. The U.S. System of Corporate Governance
The U.S. approach to the agency cost problem surrounding the zone
of insolvency is best understood in the context of the U.S. system of
corporate governance. To establish this context, this section begins with
a discussion of how the U.S. corporate governance system reflects the
country's common law origins and market landscape. Next, this section
briefly outlines the U.S. system of corporate governance, focusing on
directors' fiduciary duties.
1. Legal Origin
The U.S. legal system is based on the common law tradition, in
which judicial decisions are a major source of lawmaking. 10 This
common law system is reflected in the corporate laws of each of the fifty
7. Lin, supra note 2, at 1494-95.
8. Id. at 1496.
9. Id.
10. Rafael La Porta, et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113, 1119 (1998).
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states. Accordingly, many corporate governance rules and standards,
including directors' fiduciary duties, developed from the courts in
equity." Additionally, in comparison to civil law systems, common law




Although numerous extra-legal factors influence how corporate
governance laws operate in practice, this section focuses on patterns of
share ownership and the ownership role of banks and other creditors.
Share-ownership in the U.S. is widely dispersed and largely held by
individual investors. Many shareholders in the U.S. are passive investors
who do not actively monitor management or attempt to influence
corporate policy other than through the election and removal of directors.
Moreover, although institutional ownership and hedge fund activism is
rising in the U.S., most individual shareholders of large public
companies do not own large enough stakes to exercise a dominant
influence over management.1 3 Likewise, banks generally do not play a
significant corporate governance role in the U.S.14 Though banks may
hold shares, they are primarily debt rather than equity creditors to U.S.
corporations.
3. Corporate Governance in the U.S. 
15
The U.S. system of corporate governance operates under the
shareholder model. Under this model, directors operate the firm in a
manner that maximizes economic value for shareholder investors. Under
most circumstances, directors need not put the interests of other
stakeholders above those of the shareholders. Moreover, this model
places appointment and removal rights of directors solely in the hands of
shareholders.
Under the corporate laws of all states, directors in a solvent
corporation owe fiduciary duties to the corporation and its
shareholders.1 6 Directors owe two fiduciary duties to the corporation: the
11. See Franck Chantayan, An Examination of American and German Corporate
Law Norms, 16 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 431, 433-34, 436 (2002).
12. La Porta, et al., supra note 10, at 1116.
13. See Brian R. Cheffins, The Metamorphosis of "Germany Inc. ": The Case of
Executive Pay, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 497, 498-99 (2001).
14. Id. at 500.
15. This discussion of corporate governance in the U.S. focuses on Delaware, the
U.S. state with the most significant and well-developed corporate law.
16. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985).
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duty of care and the duty of loyalty. 17 Shareholders are empowered to
enforce fiduciary duties by bringing a derivative action on behalf of the
corporation against directors. 18 Directors that discharge the duty of care
and duty of loyalty in good faith will be entitled to the protections of the
business judgment rule when faced with a shareholder action.
19
Discharge of the duty of care requires that directors exercise an
informed business judgment when making corporate decisions.2' In
determining whether a director exercised informed business judgment, a
reviewing court will apply a standard of gross negligence. 21  This
standard requires directors to adequately inform themselves as to the
relevant facts and circumstances surrounding a proposed course of
conduct. Additionally, directors must undertake reasonable deliberation
prior to making a decision. Thus, in order to discharge the duty of care,
directors must act with informed reasonable deliberation in making
decisions on behalf of the corporation.22 In practice, the force of the duty
of care is mitigated by the ability of corporations to enact exculpatory
charter provisions that insulate directors from personal liability for good
faith breach of the duty of care.
23
Discharge of the duty of loyalty requires directors to act
"affirmatively to protect the interest of the corporation ... [and] to
refrain from doing anything that would work injury to the corporation.
24
Accordingly, directors may not advance personal interests,
misappropriate corporate opportunities, or engage in self-dealing
25transactions at the expense of the corporation. This duty does not
operate as a per se ban on self-dealing transactions. Rather, directors
engaging in self-dealing transactions must establish the entire fairness of
the transaction to overcome the presumption of self-dealing.26 Unlike the
duty of care, corporations may not exculpate directors for breach of the
duty of loyalty.27
Shareholders may bring a derivative action against directors on
behalf of the corporation alleging breach of a fiduciary duty owed to the
17. See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 113
(Del. Ch. 2005).
18. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984).
19. See id. at 177.
20. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872-73.
21. Id. at 873.
22. Id. at 883.
23. See, e.g., 8 Del. C. § 102(b)(7).
24. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983) (quoting Guth v. Loft,
Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939)).
25. James Gadsden, Enforcement of Directors' Fiduciary Duties in the Vicinity of
Insolvency, 24-Feb. AM. BANKR. INST. L.J. 16, 16 (2005).
26. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710-11.
27. See, e.g., 8 Del. C. § 102(b)(7).
[Vol. 26:1
DIRECTOR DUTIES AND CREDITOR PROTECTIONS
corporation.28 A derivative action brought by a shareholder operates
both as a shareholder suit to compel the corporation to sue and as a suit
by the corporation on its own behalf.29 The ultimate decision to initiate
litigation on behalf of a corporation rests with the board of directors.
30
Accordingly, a shareholder bringing a derivative action must first meet
the procedural hurdle of either making a demand that the board sue or
alleging that demand would be futile under the circumstances. 3 As a
practical matter, derivative suits will only commence when a court finds
the board's decision not to sue improper under the deferential business
judgment standard or when the shareholder sufficiently alleges facts
supporting demand futility.
32
Directors who discharge the duty of care and duty of loyalty in good
faith will be entitled to the protections of the business judgment rule
when faced with shareholder litigation. The business judgment rule is a
judicial presumption that directors, when making a business decision,
"acted on an informed basis, in good faith, and in the honest belief that
the action taken was in the best interests of the company. 33
Accordingly, a reviewing court will not second-guess the business
judgment of an informed, disinterested director who acted in good faith.
The business judgment rule operates both procedurally and
substantively.34 Procedurally, the rule places the initial evidentiary
burden on a plaintiff shareholder to offer evidence that the board
breached the duty of care, duty of loyalty, or otherwise did not act in
good faith.35 If the shareholder fails to carry this burden, the substantive
protections of the business judgment rule attach, shielding the defendant
directors from personal liability.36 On the other hand, if the shareholder
carries the initial evidentiary burden, the court will apply the entire
fairness standard to determine director liability. 37 Accordingly, the ex
post standards by which director decisions will be judged under U.S. law
are relatively director-friendly, with policy goals of promoting risk-
taking and entrepreneurialism.
28. See, e.g., Spiegel v. Buntrock, 571 A.2d 767, 773 (Del. 1990).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 773.
32. Id. In order to allege demand futility, a shareholder must allege facts that create
a reasonable doubt as to either the independence of the board or the validity of the
business judgment exercised in the transaction.
33. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812.
34. See Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1162 (Del. 1995).
35. McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 917 (Del. 2000).
36. Id.
37. Cinerama, 663 A.2d at 1162.
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B. Defining the Zone of Insolvency in the U.S.
The judicially-delineated boundaries of the zone of insolvency are
"imprecise and hard-to-define." 38  As such, no precise test has been
applied to determine whether a corporation is operating in the zone of
insolvency. 39 Rather, reviewing courts will apply the more familiar tests
of solvency in determining whether a decision took place in the zone of
insolvency.4 °
Courts apply two tests to determine the solvency of a corporation.41
The "balance sheet" test looks at a corporation's balance sheet to
determine whether the fair market value of its liabilities is greater than
the fair market value of its assets.42 Some courts add to this the
additional requirement that the corporation face "no reasonable prospect
that the business can be successfully continued in the face thereof."
43
Alternatively, the "cash flow" or "equity" test assesses whether the
corporation has sufficient cash flow to service its debts as they become
due in the ordinary course of business. 44 A plaintiff need only plead
facts sufficient under one of these tests to demonstrate a corporation's
insolvency.45
Under either test, a reviewing court will review a corporation's
solvency in hindsight and without deference to representations made in
board meetings or in audited financial statements.46 As a practical
matter, this suggests that directors should assess a company's solvency
conservatively and presume insolvency when a reasonable doubt exists.
47
The prudence of this conservative approach is buttressed by the reality
that creditors, benefiting from plaintiff-friendly pleading standards, can
get discovery in fiduciary duty claims in situations where a corporation is
ultimately determined to be solvent.48
In summary, it is uncertain whether a corporation is operating in the
38. Production Res. Group v. NCT Group, 863 A.2d 772, 789-90 n. 56 (Del. Ch.
2004).
39. John M. Sjovall, What Duty Do Company Directors Owe to Banks and Other
Creditors?, 121 BANKJNG L.J. 4, 13 (2004).
40. See generally Richard M. Cieri & Michael J. Riela, Protecting Directors and
Officers of Corporations That Are Insolvent or in the Zone or Vicinity of Insolvency:
Important Considerations, Practical Solutions, 2 DEPAUL Bus. & COMM. L.J. 295 (2004).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Production Res., 863 A.2d at 782 (quoting Sipie v. S & K Plumbing & Heating,
Inc., 1982 WL 8789, at *2 (Del. Ch. 1982)).
44. Cieri & Riela, supra note 40; see also Production Res., 863 A.2d at 782.
45. Production Res., 863 A.2d at 782.
46. Cieri & Riela, supra note 40.
47. Id.
48. Production Res., 863 A.2d at 789-90 n. 56.
[Vol. 26:1
DIRECTOR DUTIES AND CREDITOR PROTECTIONS
zone of insolvency because its boundaries are not easily ascertainable by
a board of directors or a reviewing court.
C. The U.S. Response to the Agency Costs Problems in the Zone of
Insolvency
1. Credit Lyonnais and its Progeny: Directors' Duty to Creditors
or a Shift to the Stakeholder Model?
The genesis of creditors' ability to bring breach of fiduciary duty
claims against directors once a corporation enters the zone of insolvency
can be traced to a 1991 decision by the Delaware Court of Chancery,
Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N. V v. Pathe Communications Corp.
("Credit Lyonnais"). Here, the court merely mentioned the possibility
that the duties of a director expand beyond the corporation and its
shareholders in the zone of insolvency.49 Savvy creditors' attorneys
interpreted this language to stand for the proposition that fiduciary duties
of directors shift to creditors once a corporation enters the zone of
insolvency.50 This led to a flurry of fiduciary duty claims by creditors
attempting to recover as much as possible from insolvent corporations. 51
Some courts have allowed creditors to proceed with these claims.
52
In a 2004 decision that revisited Credit Lyonnais, the Delaware
Court of Chancery reined in creditors' ability to raise fiduciary duty
claims against directors.53 In Production Res. Group v. NCT Group
("Production Resources"), the court clarified that fiduciary duty claims
against directors belong to the corporation at all times. 54 Thus, directors'
fiduciary duties do not shift to creditors once a corporation enters the
zone of insolvency.55 However, when a corporation enters the zone of
insolvency, the scope of interests that directors may take into account
expands beyond merely shareholders to include other stakeholders,
including creditors.56 Moreover, creditors have standing to raise these
49. 1991 WL 277613, *34 n. 55 (Del. Ch. 1991).
50. Mark N. Berman, Delaware Court Reigns in Creditor Suits Against Ds & Os,
24-4 AMER. BANK. L.J. 22, 22 (2005). As used in this context, "Reigns" is spelled
incorrectly. The correct spelling of the word is "Reins." However, I see that even the
bankruptcy journal spelled it incorrectly. Since it is used in the title of an article here, I
don't see that it is imperative to mark it with [sic]. However, you will see that I changed
"reign" to "rein" in the text of the article supra and infra where appropriate.
51. See id.
52. See generally Production Res., 863 A.2d at 789.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 776.
55. See id. at 792.
56. Id. at 788.
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claims upon the corporation's insolvency.
Credit Lyonnais involved the scope of a contractual duty of loyalty
arising from an unsuccessful leveraged buyout.57 Although the case
involved contractual duty, the court considered the scope of corporate
directors' common law fiduciary duties in the zone of insolvency in
evaluating the contractual claims.58 In doing so, the court stated that
"where a corporation is operating in the vicinity of insolvency, a board of
directors .. owes its duty to the corporate enterprise. 59 In a footnote,
the court added that in the zone of insolvency, directors should reach the
best outcome when they "consider the community of interests that the
corporation represents."60  Accordingly, the court recognized that in
proper business decisions, directors need not follow the course of action
desired by the shareholders, the creditors, the employees, "or any single
group interested in the corporation.'
61
In Credit Lyonnais, the court did not say that fiduciary duties shift
to creditors once a corporation enters the zone of insolvency. Likewise,
the court did not address whether creditors may bring fiduciary duty
claims arising from director decisions in the vicinity of insolvency.
These omissions left Credit Lyonnais open to two possible
interpretations. First, the case could be interpreted as giving creditors
(and other stakeholders) a sword to bring fiduciary duty claims against
director decisions while the company was in the zone of insolvency.
62
Second, the language could be interpreted as giving directors a shield
that protects them from shareholder challenges to decisions that take
other stakeholders' interests into consideration.63
According to one commentator, Credit Lyonnais led to an
"explosion" of fiduciary duty claims brought by creditors against
directors of failed businesses.64 These lawsuits certainly raised the
eyebrows of corporate directors and influenced decision-making in
struggling companies.65
Creditors' breach of fiduciary duty claims against directors survived
a motion to dismiss in Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of
Buckhead Am. Corp. v. Reliance Capital Group, Inc.66 In the complaint,
57. 1991 WL 277613 at *1-2.
58. Id. at *33-34.
59. Id. at *34.
60. Id. at *34 n. 55.
61. Id.
62. See Royce de R. Barondes, Fiduciary Duties of Officers and Directors of
Distressed Corporations, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 45, 66 (1998).
63. Id.
64. Berman, supra note 50, at 22.
65. See generally id.
66. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Buckhead Am. Corp. v. Reliance
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the creditors alleged that the directors breached fiduciary duties in
approving a leveraged buyout transaction that rendered the corporation
insolvent.67 In its application of Delaware corporate law, the District of
Delaware cited Credit Lyonnais for the proposition that directors
operating in the zone of insolvency owe fiduciary duties to the
corporation's creditors.68 Accordingly, the court allowed the creditors
complaint to proceed because the alleged breach took place while the
company was in the zone of insolvency.69
Likewise, creditors' fiduciary duty claims against directors survived
a summary judgment motion in Weaver v. Kellogg.70 In response to the
claims, the defendant directors argued that directors owe a duty to
creditors only when the corporation is insolvent.71  Rejecting this
assertion, the Southern District of Texas reasoned that, under both
Delaware and Texas law, directors of solvent corporations might owe a
fiduciary duty to creditors in limited circumstances. 72 Accordingly, the
court held that directors owe a fiduciary duty to creditors when the
corporation is in the zone of insolvency or when the challenged
transaction led to the corporation's insolvency.73
Production Resources outlines the proper scope of Delaware law
regarding creditors' ability to raise fiduciary duty claims against
directors in the zone of insolvency. In this case, a judgment creditor
brought several fiduciary duty claims against a corporation's directors
alleging, inter alia, mismanagement of the company and faithless
behavior.74 In evaluating the creditor's ability to raise these claims, the
Court of Chancery outlined the framework under which creditors may
bring fiduciary duty claims against directors. This framework interpreted
Credit Lyonnais as providing a shield for directors who consider interests
beyond those of shareholders in the zone of insolvency.75 Accordingly,
Production Resources restricts the ability of creditors to use fiduciary
duty claims against directors as a mechanism to increase their recovery
from insolvent corporations.
The court's analysis in Production Resources begins from the well-
established principle that directors of a solvent firm must operate the




70. Weaver v. Kellogg, 216 B.R. 563, 584 (S.D. Tex. 1997).
71. Id. at 583.
72. Id. at 584.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 777.
75. Production Res., 863 A.2d at 787-88.
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firm in a manner that primarily maximizes value for shareholders.76
Once the corporation enters the zone of insolvency, directors may take
into account other stakeholders, including creditors, when managing the
firm.77 To this point, the court says that Credit Lyonnais merely
emphasizes that "directors have discretion to temper the risk that they
take on behalf of the equity holders when the firm is in the zone of
insolvency. ' 8 Accordingly, Credit Lyonnais does not create "a new
body of creditor's rights law" contrary to some interpretations.79
According to the court, once a firm enters the zone of insolvency,
Credit Lyonnais holds that directors will be protected by the business
judgment rule when a business decision considers the interests of
stakeholders other than the shareholders. 80 The "context of high risk and
uncertainty" that exists in the zone of insolvency allows directors to
consider the "community of interest" of the corporate enterprise, not
merely that of the shareholders. 8' Directors' fiduciary duties do not shift
from shareholders to creditors in the zone of insolvency. Furthermore,
the zone of insolvency does not confer standing on creditors to challenge
directors' business decisions as a breach of fiduciary duty.82
This framework does not leave creditors without corporate
governance protections. Once a firm becomes insolvent, directors owe
fiduciary duties to creditors under Delaware law.83 Thus, insolvency
confers upon creditors standing to pursue fiduciary duty claims against
directors.84 Moreover, the broad grant of creditor standing extends to
fiduciary duty claims alleging that director actions prior to insolvency
caused a firm to become insolvent.85 To the extent that director action in
the zone of insolvency causes a firm to become insolvent, creditors may
have standing to bring a fiduciary duty claim for after-the-fact
86insolvency.
Although insolvency confers standing to bring fiduciary duty claims
to creditors, such claims belong to the corporation and can generally only
be brought by creditors through derivative actions.87 Additionally, the
fact that insolvency confers standing upon creditors to bring fiduciary
76. Id. at 787.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 788.
79. Id.
80. Production Res., 863 A.2d at 788.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 789.
83. Id. at 790-91.
84. Id. at 792.
85. Production Res., 863 A.2d at 792-93.
86. See generally id.
87. Id.
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duty claims derivatively does not affect the ability of shareholders to
bring such claims.88
Production Resources suggests the possibility that an individual
creditor could bring a direct fiduciary duty claim in limited
circumstances. 89 The limited circumstances supporting a direct creditor
action require director animus toward an individual creditor with a
proven entitlement to payment.90
2. Creditor Protections in the Zone of Insolvency: Distilling the
Production Resources Framework
U.S. corporate law responds to the agency cost problem of
shareholder opportunism vis-A-vis creditors in the zone of insolvency
with two regulatory strategies. The first strategy consists of an
expansion of the ex post standard by which director action in the zone of
insolvency will be reviewed. Under the Production Resources
framework, once a corporation enters the zone of insolvency, the set of
interests that directors may consider in making decisions expands to
include creditors and other stakeholders. This addresses the conflict of
interest between creditors and shareholders by deferring to the business
judgment of directors. It gives directors the discretion to pursue the
course of action that maximizes firm value regardless of the individual
preferences of shareholders and creditors.
The second strategy gives creditors standing to challenge director
action under these ex post standards. Once a company becomes
insolvent, creditors have standing to bring fiduciary duty claims against
directors. Additionally, creditors have standing to challenge director
action that caused a company to become insolvent. Creditors can
generally only bring such claims derivatively unless the claim alleges
director animus toward a particular creditor. Finally, fiduciary duty
claims brought by creditors are reviewed under the business judgment
rule. 91 Thus, even though creditors have standing to raise fiduciary duty
claims, a reviewing court will defer to the good faith business judgment
of an informed, disinterested director.
88. Id. at 792.
89. Id. at 798.
90. Production Res., 863 A.2d at 798.
91. See Liquidation Trust of Hechinger Inv. Co. of Del. v. Fleet Retail Fin. Group,
327 B.R. 537, 548-49 (D. Del. 2005) (reviewing creditors breach of fiduciary duty claims
under the business judgment rule).
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IV. Germany's Response to the Agency Cost Problem in the Zone of
Insolvency
A. Germany's System of Corporate Governance
Germany's system of corporate governance differs from the U.S.
both structurally and substantively. Structurally, German companies are
required to adopt a two-tier board of directors in an attempt to protect
shareholder interests.92  Additionally, Germany's system of
codetermination requires employee representation on the upper-tier
supervisory board, making German boards much larger than boards of
comparable companies in the U.S. 93 Substantively, Germany operates
under the stakeholder model, where directors manage the firm on behalf
of shareholders, employees, and the larger community. Also, German
banks play a more central role in corporate governance than their
counterparts in the U.S.
1. Legal Origin
German law follows the civil law tradition, where legal rules come
primarily from statutes and comprehensive codes. 94  In contrast to
common law countries, civil law countries rely on legal scholars as
opposed to judges to formulate law.95  Additionally, compared to
common law countries, civil law countries provide weaker protections to
both shareholders and creditors but provide them with stronger
enforcement mechanisms.96
2. Extralegal Landscape
Germany's pattern of share ownership and role of banks in
corporate governance differ starkly from those in the U.S. In Germany,
share ownership is highly concentrated. Families, institutional investors,
insurance companies, and the state hold large blocks of shares.97 These
shareholders are more likely to exercise significant influence over
management than are individual shareholders in the U.S. Likewise,
banks play a significant corporate governance role in Germany. In
addition to owning significant equity interests in public companies,
92. See generally REWNIER R. KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE
LAW 34-35 (2004).
93. Id. at 39-40.
94. La Porta et al., supra note 10, at 1118.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1116.
97. See Cheffins, supra note 13, at 500.
[Vol. 26:1
DIRECTOR DUTIES AND CREDITOR PROTECTIONS
banks hold and vote shares for individual shareholders.98 This gives
banks a significant voice in German boardrooms. 99
3. Director Duties under Germany's Corporate Governance
System
Germany's system of corporate governance operates under the
stakeholder model. Under this model directors operate the firm for the
benefit of the shareholders as well as other constituents, including
employees and the community. 00 A German cultural norm suggests that
management should give each corporate constituent's interests equal
weight in decision-making. 10 1 However, in practice, management often
aligns with banks and other powerful shareholders.
0 2
German law requires corporations to adopt a two-tier, hierarchical
board structure. 0 3 Shareholders and employees elect members of the
supervisory board. 10 4 The supervisory board appoints and oversees the
management board. 105 In turn, the management board conducts the
affairs of the corporation. 1
06
The exclusive powers to control and operate German corporations
are vested in the management board. 107 In managing the affairs of the
corporation, directors must act with the care of a diligent and
conscientious manager.'08 Director liability to the corporation may be
found where a director negligently or willfully breaches this duty.'09
Although this duty appears relatively broad, personal liability is rare as
directors are protected by procedural safeguards and a deferential
standard of review protects directors. 110 Accordingly, the threat of losing
reelection to the board operates as a stronger constraint on German
directors than the statutory duty of care."'
German law allows only the board to bring a lawsuit on behalf of
98. Id.
99. See, e.g., Chantayan, supra note 11, at 445-46.
100. Id. at 444.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 445.
103. KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 93, at 35.
104. Id.
105. § 111 Aktiengesetz translated in HANNES SCHNEIDER AND MARTIN HEIDENHAIN,
THE GERMAN STOCK CORPORATION ACT (2000) [hereinafter Aktiengesetz]; see also id.
106. § 76 Aktiengesetz; see also Chantayan, supra note 11, at 437-38.
107. See Chantayan, supra note 11, at 438.
108. § 93 Aktiengesetz; see also Theodor Baums & Kenneth E. Scott, Taking
Shareholder Protection Seriously? Corporate Governance in the United States and
Germany, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 31, 44 (2005).
109. See Baums and Scott, supra note 109, at 44.
110. Id.at44-45.
111. Id. at 45.
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the corporation. 12  Additionally, lawsuits challenging actions of the
management board or against directors individually may only be brought
by the supervisory board.1 13 Thus, unlike the U.S. system, shareholders
of German corporation's typically do not bring derivative actions
challenging director action. Moreover, the supervisory board faces
disincentives to bring litigation against the management board since the
corresponding allegations often question the supervisory board's
performance. 1
14
Recent changes to German law have given shareholders more power
to challenge director action.!15  First, shareholders can force the
corporation to bring litigation against directors with a majority vote at
the shareholders meeting.1 6  Depending on the defendant, a lawsuit
brought under this provision will be run by the management board, the
supervisory board or an independent representative. 1 7  Second,
shareholders with sufficient holdings may bring derivative actions
alleging serious legal violations or violations of the corporate charter.
1 8
However, shareholders often lack incentives to bring such actions. 19
As a practical matter, the incentives and legal hurdles involved in
litigation against directors lead to the reality that directors rarely face
personal liability for breach of fiduciary duty.120  As one commentator
has noted, German managers "almost never [face] ... liability for a
breach of the duty of care" unless the breach involves a violation of
law. 
121
Directors faced with litigation for a breach of fiduciary duty benefit
from a fairly deferential standard of review. A director has the burden of
proving that they acted as an appropriate manager would.1 22 Although
this is a higher standard than the U.S. business judgment rule, which puts
the initial burden on plaintiffs, German courts have looked to the
business judgment rule in defining this standard. 23  Accordingly,
112. § 78 Aktiengesetz; see Chantayan, supra note 11, at 443.
113. § 112 Aktiengesetz; see also Chantayan, supra note 11, at 443.
114. See generally Baums and Scott, supra note 109, at 52.
115. Baums and Scott, supra note 109, at 52.
116. § 147(1) Aktiengesetz.
117. Id. at § 147(2); see also Baums and Scott, supra note 109, at 52. The
supervisory board will run litigation against the management board, the management
board will run litigation against the supervisory board, and a special representative will
run the litigation in limited circumstances.
118. § 148(l) Aktiengesetz.
119. See Baums and Scott, supra note 109, at 52.
120. Id. at 45.
121. Id.
122. § 93 Aktiengesetz.
123. See Mark E. Nance and Bernd Singhof, Banking's Influence over Non-Bank
Companies After Glass-Steagall: A German Universal Comparison, 14 EMORY INT'L L.
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German directors properly discharge their fiduciary duties when they act
on an informed basis, in good faith, with the reasonable belief that the
action is in the best interest of the company, and do not pursue an
excessively risky course of action.124 Additionally, German directors
benefit from the ability to consider the interests of other stakeholders in
making a decision for the corporation.
B. Defining the Zone of Insolvency in Germany
The parameters of the zone of insolvency under German law are
amorphous and difficult to define. Like the judicial decisions in the U.S.,
legal rules in Germany attempt to delineate situations where a
corporation is approaching insolvency prior to the initiation of
insolvency proceedings.125 Accordingly, German law lists three distinct
situations where a corporation is considered approaching insolvency.
First, German law treats a company that experienced substantial
annual losses as approaching insolvency. 26 The threshold of losses
under this test is equal to one-half the share of capital on the annual
balance sheet.127  Secondly, a corporation may be approaching
insolvency when it is unable to make payments when payments are
due. 2 8 And, finally, over-indebtedness is an indication that a corporation
is approaching insolvency as well.
129
C. Germany's Response to the Agency Cost Problems in the Zone of
Insolvency
German law addresses the agency cost problems encountered in the
zone of insolvency by providing creditors additional corporate
governance protections when a company approaches insolvency. These
corporate governance protections can be organized into two categories.
First, legal rules impose specific duties on directors as a company
approaches insolvency. Second, directors are personally liable to
creditors for failure to discharge the duties created in the zone of
insolvency.
1. Director Duties as Corporation Approaches Insolvency
When each of the statutory conditions defining "approaching
REV. 1305, 1410 (2000).
124. Id.
125. See generally § 92 Aktiengesetz.
126. § 92(1) Aktiengesetz.
127. Id.
128. Id. at § 92(2).
129. Id. at § 92(3).
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insolvency" are met, German law imposes specific duties on directors.
Once a corporation becomes over-indebted or is otherwise unable to
make payments when due, members of the management board have a
statutory duty to limit payments.1 30  Any payment made after the
occurrence of insolvency or over-indebtedness must be consistent with
the general duty of care. Accordingly, directors may only make
payments that are "consistent with the care of a diligent and
conscientious manager."
131
This duty to limit payments protects creditors by preventing
managers from siphoning off the firm's assets to shareholders in the form
of dividends or share repurchases. Additionally, it protects existing
creditors by allowing payments consistent with the duty of care. Finally,
it protects creditors by preserving the order of payment priority that
exists in insolvency proceedings. This is achieved by preventing
management from making preferential payments to favored creditors
unless consistent with the duty of care. Likewise, the management board
must initiate insolvency proceedings once a corporation becomes over-
indebted or unable to make payments when due. 1
32
Aktiengesetz, the German Stock Corporation Act, requires
management to initiate insolvency proceedings without undue delay.
133
Although undue delay is not defined, insolvency proceedings must be
initiated within three weeks after the corporation becomes over-indebted
or unable to make payments when due. 134  This duty to initiate
insolvency proceedings protects creditors in several ways. First, it
prevents directors from gambling with corporate assets by undertaking
risky investments when the company is nearing insolvency. Second, it
provides notice to existing and potential creditors of the company's
financial distress. Third, by initiating insolvency proceedings quickly, it
preserves the priority of payment established by the insolvency regime,
preventing payments to preferred creditors.
Once a corporation experiences losses equal to half of the share of
capital on the annual balance sheet, the management board must call a
shareholders meeting. 135 At the meeting, management must provide the
shareholders with notice of the corporation's financial distress. 136 This
duty to call a shareholders meeting provides protection to both
shareholders and creditors by providing prompt notice of the company's
130. Id.
131. § 92(3) Aktiengesetz.
132. Id. at § 92(2).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at § 92(1).
136. § 92(1) Aktiengesetz.
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financial distress. Although primarily aimed at notifying shareholders,
creditors will benefit as well, since many banks are also shareholders.
2. Directors' Personal Liability to Creditors for Failure to
Discharge these Duties
In addition to imposing specific duties on directors once a
corporation enters the zone of insolvency, German law provides
additional creditor protection through director liability. Directors can be
found personally liable to creditors for failure to discharge statutory
duties and for failure to adhere to capital maintenance rules. 1
37
Creditors' ability to recover from directors personally provides two
forms of protection. First, the threat of personal liability gives directors
stronger incentives to discharge duties owed to creditors and to adhere to
capital maintenance rules. Second, the ability of creditors to recover
from directors' personal assets increases the likelihood that creditors will
salvage something when the corporation cannot satisfy their claims.
Creditors may pursue personal liability claims against directors only
when the creditor cannot recover from the corporation itself.138 As a
procedural matter, claims brought by creditors are direct, with creditors
seeking damages individually rather than on behalf of the corporation.
1 39
This differs from the approach in the U.S., where creditors must pursue
derivative claims under most circumstances.1 40  However, once
insolvency proceedings have been instituted, creditors' claims are
brought by the trustee of the estate, rather than individual creditors.
141
Also, since these claims belong to creditors and not the corporation,
exculpatory provisions limiting directors' personal liability to the
corporation do not prevent the creditors' ability to recover from
directors. 142
German law allows creditors to recover personally from directors
who violate certain enumerated duties. Section 93(3) of the Aktiengesetz
lists nine situations through which creditors may asset claims against
directors. In financially distressed companies, creditors can pursue
directors for, inter alia, repayment of contributions to shareholders,
payment of interest or dividends to shareholders, distributing assets of
the company, making payments once the company is over-indebted, and
137. Id. at § 93(5); see generally KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 93, at 90.
138. § 93(5) Aktiengesetz; see also Susan-Jacqueline Butler, Models of Modern
Corporations: A Comparative Analysis of German and U.S. Corporate Structures, 17
AR1Z. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 555, 569 (2000).
139. Butler, supra note 139, at 570.
140. See Part III C, supra.
141. § 93(3), (5) Aktiengesetz.
142. Id.
2007]
PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
extending additional credit. 143 However, the code specifies that directors
are only liable to creditors under a gross negligence standard.14 4  In
addition to the situations enumerated in § 93(3), creditors may bring
claims against directors for gross violations of the duty of care.
145
Directors are subject to personal liability to creditors for failure to
adhere to capital maintenance rules at any time. 146 Although director
liability under this provision is irrespective of whether the corporation is
in the zone of insolvency, as a practical matter, creditors are not
encouraged to bring a claim against a director under this provision unless
the company is in financial distress. Directors face per se liability to
creditors under this provision.
147
V. Japan's Response to the Agency Cost Problem in the Zone of
Insolvency
A. Japan's System of Corporate Governance
1. Legal Origin
Like Germany, Japan is a civil law country. The Japanese
Commercial Code initially developed from the German civil law system
but was substantially influenced by American law following World War
11.148 Notwithstanding this American influence, Japanese corporate law
lacks the flexibility of the American system. 149 Since Japan is a civil law
country, Japanese judges are constrained to legal analysis under the




Share ownership patterns and the role of banks significantly
influence Japanese corporate governance practice. Like share ownership
in Germany, share ownership in Japan is concentrated. Unique to the
comparative countries, the stock of many Japanese countries is held in a
system of cross-ownership with banks and relational corporations.
143. Id.
144. § 93(5) Aktiengesetz.
145. Id.; see also Butler, supra note 139, at 570.
146. See KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 93, at 90.
147. Id.
148. See La Porta et al., supra note 10, at 1119.
149. See Zenishi Shishido, Japanese Corporate Governance: The Hidden Problems of
Corporate Law and Their Solutions, 25 DEL. J. CORP. L. 189, 195 (2000).
150. Id.
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Additionally, like German banks, Japanese banks hold substantial
ownership stakes in Japanese firms. Main banks, which function both as
major lenders and significant shareholders, play an important role in
Japanese corporate governance.1
5 1
Two types of cross-ownership patterns are prevalent in Japanese
firms. First, many Japanese corporations hold shares of other companies
under implicit, long-term mutual shareholding agreements.152 This loose
form of cross-ownership constitutes approximately two-thirds of share
ownership in Japan. 15 3 Second, Japanese corporations affiliate through
sophisticated, tightly-woven cross-ownership patterns called keiretsu.'
54
In addition to mutual shareholding agreements, keiretsu are linked
through mutual directors, product markets, and banking relationships.
1 55
Both systems of cross-ownership stabilize management by ensuring that
large blocks of shares are in friendly hands, minimizing the threat of
hostile takeover. 156 Additionally, cross-ownership mitigates the conflict
of interest between shareholders and creditors by ensuring many
shareholders are also creditors.
While banks generally play a significant role in Japanese corporate
governance, the role of the main bank predominates. Main banks
function as both the principal lender to a Japanese corporation and a
major shareholder.1 57  Additionally, main banks sit at the center of
keiretsu.1 58 In good times, main banks play a significant monitoring and
informational role in corporate governance. 159 In bad times, the role of
main banks spans from the provision of financial and advisory assistance
to restructuring or merging a failing company. 60 The relational role of
main banks means that few unsuccessful companies are liquidated in
Japan. 161 However, main banks often replace the management of failing
companies, making them significant players in the zone of insolvency. 162
151. Curtis J. Milhaupt, A Relational Theory of Japanese Corporate Governance:
Contract, Culture, and the Rule of Law, 37 HARV. INT'L L.J. 3, 22 (1996).
152. See id. at 25; see also Shishido, supra note 149, at 210-11.
153. Milhaupt, supra note 151, at 25.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.; see also Shishido, supra note 149, at 210-11.
157. See Milhaupt, supra note 151, at 22.
158. Id. at 25.
159. !d. at 22.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Milhaupt, supra note 151.
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3. Director Duties under the Japanese Corporate Governance
System
Like the German system, Japan operates under the stakeholder
model of corporate governance. The Japanese stakeholder model is
reflected more in practice than in the law on the books. 63  The
stakeholder model is best observed in the Japanese cultural norm of the
"company community," which consists of directors, managers, and
employees. 164 Unlike the role of the employee under Japan's corporate
laws on the books, employees play a central role in the company
community and corporate governance in practice. 161
The Japanese Commercial Code articulates the fiduciary duties that
directors owe to the corporation and its shareholders. 166  Like U.S.
directors, Japanese directors owe a duty of care and duty of loyalty to the
corporation.' 67 Also, like U.S. shareholders, Japanese shareholders can
enforce fiduciary duties through derivative litigation under Japanese law.
However, unlike in the U.S., Japanese fiduciary duties are seldom
enforced through shareholder litigation, leaving the case law largely
undeveloped in this area. Notwithstanding the level of enforcement, the
Commercial Code provides personal liability for a director's breach of
fiduciary duty.'68
In managing the affairs of the corporation, Japanese directors must
discharge both the duty of care and the duty of loyalty. The duty of care
obliges directors to manage the affairs of the corporation with the care of
a good manager. 169 The duty of loyalty requires directors to perform
their duties faithfully and in compliance with the law, the corporate
charter, and shareholders' resolutions. 170  Although current debate
surrounds whether these statutory duties are distinct, Japanese courts
have found directors liable under both provisions. 171
Japan allows shareholders to enforce fiduciary duties through
derivative actions against directors. 72  Like derivative actions in the
163. See Shishindo, supra note 149, at 202.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Art. 254-3 Commercial Code; see also Shishido, supra note 149, at 199 n. 45.
167. See Bruce E. Aronson, Learning from Comparative Law Teaching in US.
Corporate Law: Director's Liability in Japan and the US., 22 PENN ST. INT'L L. REv.
213, 221 (2003).
168. Art. 266 Commercial Code; see also Aronson, supra note 167, at 221.
169. Art. 254 Commercial Code; see also Aronson, supra note 167, at 221.
170. Art. 254-3 Commercial Code; see also Hideki Kanda & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Re-
examining Legal Transplants: The Director's Fiduciary Duty in Japanese Corporate
Law, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 887, 888 (2003).
171. See Kanda & Milhaupt, supra note 170, at 894-97.
172. Shishido, supra note 149, at 197.
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U.S., Japanese shareholders must first make a demand that the board sue
on behalf of the corporation.173 However, Japanese law gives directors
less discretion in determining whether to bring litigation than does U.S.
law. 174 Additionally, recent reforms have made it easier and cheaper for
shareholders to file derivative actions, leading to an increase in
shareholder litigation. 175 Despite this increase in shareholder litigation, it
remains a weak constraint on director action. As one commentator has
noted, shareholders "have seldom sought ex post judicial enforcement of
the fiduciary duties of management." 1
76
The infrequency of shareholder litigation in Japan has produced a
relatively thin body of case law interpreting director duties. 77 However,
recent case law suggests that courts will apply a director-friendly
standard of review similar to the U.S. business judgment rule.
178
Additionally, although Japan operates under the stakeholder model, no
judicial decision expressly authorizes Japanese directors to consider the
interests of stakeholders other than the shareholders in making business
decisions. 179  The Japanese Commercial Code does not contain
mechanisms limiting or exculpating directors from personal liability.
80
B. Defining the Zone of Insolvency in Japan
Unlike the U.S. and Germany, Japan's corporate law does not
delineate specific triggers that modify director duties to creditors.
Rather, the creditor protections in the Japanese legal system operate
irrespective of whether the company is in the zone of insolvency.
However, reason dictates that creditors will attempt to recover from
directors in law as opposed to from the company in contract in situations
where the corporation cannot satisfy the creditor's claim. Thus, it
follows that Japan's creditor protections will only be necessary after a
corporation has entered the zone of insolvency.
C. Japan's Response to the Agency Cost Problems in the Zone of
Insolvency
An analysis of the Japanese approach to the agency cost problems
prevalent in the zone of insolvency requires a look at both the law on the
173. See generally id.
174. Id. at 197-98.
175. Id. at 197.
176. Milhaupt, supra note 151, at 20.
177. Id. at 33-34.
178. See id. at 33 (discussing case that upheld director action under a business
judgment rule).
179. Shishido, supra note 149, at 199.
180. Milhaupt, supra note 151, at 34.
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books and at how corporate governance in distressed companies plays
out in practice. First, this section will look at the single legal strategy
Japan has adopted to address this agency cost problem. Next, this
section will turn to the realities of corporate governance in distressed
Japanese firms in an attempt to explain the law's minimal response.
Japan provides little creditor protection in the form of regulatory
strategies to address the problems of shareholder opportunism vis-A-vis
creditors in the zone of insolvency. Under limited circumstances, the
Japanese Commercial Code confers standing upon creditors to sue non-
executive directors personally for lack of oversight of management.
81
Liability under this duty to monitor doctrine requires gross negligence on
the part of the director. 182 However, in practice, no creditor has prevailed
against a director of a large corporation under the duty to monitor
doctrine.' 83 Moreover, the doctrine focuses more on the supervision of
subordinate employees, rather than general oversight of the board of
directors, further mitigating its utility in this context.1 84 Although it is
seldom used, this regulatory strategy protects creditors by providing
them recourse to go after grossly negligent directors personally when the
company cannot satisfy their claim.
In practice, main banks exert significant corporate governance
control once companies approaching insolvency. Once companies
experience financial distress, main banks direct corporate actions, replace
management, and determine whether to restructure, merge, or liquidate
the company. This reality means that legal strategies protecting creditors
in the zone of insolvency are largely unnecessary, since the struggling
corporation's largest creditor will be calling the shots.185  Moreover,
because of the cultural norm disfavoring litigation, additional legal
strategies would not likely provide stronger protection to creditors in
practice.
VI. Analyzing Each Jurisdiction's Response to the Agency Cost
Problem
Each comparative jurisdiction addresses the agency cost problem of
shareholder opportunism vis-d-vis creditors prevalent in the zone of
insolvency through either regulatory strategies or corporate governance
practice. The U.S. and Germany respond to this agency cost problem
181. Art. 266 Commercial Code; see also KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 93, at 90.
182. See KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 93, at 90.
183. Id.
184. See Bruce E. Aronson, Reconsidering the Importance of Law in Japanese
Corporate Governance: Evidence from the Daiwa Bank Shareholder Derivative Case, 36
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 11, 26-27 n. 69, n. 70 (2003).
185. See Milhaupt, supra note 151, at 22-23.
[Vol. 26:1
DIRECTOR DUTIES AND CREDITOR PROTECTIONS
through a combination of regulatory strategies that shift the scope of
director duties to include creditors and provide creditors standing to
enforce these duties once a company enters the zone of insolvency. In
contrast, Japan provides one marginally useful legal response. However,
strategies implemented in Japanese corporate governance practice
address this agency cost problem.
The U.S. implements two regulatory strategies to protect creditors
in the zone of insolvency. First, the scope of the ex post standard by
which director liability for business decisions expands once a company
enters the zone of insolvency to allow directors to consider the interests
of creditors and other stakeholders. Second, once a company becomes
insolvent, creditors have standing to raise fiduciary duty claims against
directors for decisions in the zone of insolvency that led to the
corporation's insolvency. Likewise, Germany implements two legal
strategies that protect creditors once a corporation enters the zone of
insolvency. First, as a company approaches insolvency, director duties
expand to include required actions aimed at protecting creditors. Second,
Germany gives creditors standing to enforce breaches of these duties. In
contrast, Japan's strongest creditor protection comes from the practice of
main banks dominating corporate governance in the zone of insolvency.
Although Japan has legal rules aimed at protecting creditors in struggling
companies, these rules are rarely used in practice. Overall, the legal and
practical response adopted by each comparative jurisdiction provides
differing levels of creditor protection and director flexibility.
A. Analytical Framework
This article applies an analytical framework that compares each
county's legal strategy under three factors. First, it determines whether
the strategy minimizes the conflict of interests between shareholders and
creditors, which would reduce the agency cost problems in the zone of
insolvency. Second, it asks whether the strategy maximizes firm value,
creditor value, or shareholder value. Third, this framework looks at the
clarity and predictability that the legal strategy provides to directors,
creditors, and shareholders. Of the three factors, the minimization of
conflicts of interest and the ability to maximize firm value carry the
greatest weight.
B. Minimization of Creditor and Shareholder Conflicts of Interest
The agency cost problems in the zone of insolvency are magnified
by four specific conflicts of interest between shareholders and
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creditors. 186  These specific conflicts of interest are divergent risk
preferences, shareholder incentives to siphon assets out of the firm,
liquidation preferences, and shareholders incentives for
underinvestment. 87 The U.S. legal response to the agency cost problems
in the zone of insolvency addresses three of these four conflicts of
interest.
First, by allowing managers to consider the interests of both
shareholders and creditors, the impact of divergent risk preferences
between these groups is mitigated. This allows management to use its
expertise to pursue the course of action it feels is best for the corporation
as an economic entity. Moreover, the U.S. strategy protects managers
who enter transactions for the benefit of the firm in good faith.
Second, granting creditors standing to sue directors for breaching
the duty of loyalty once the company is insolvent gives creditors the
ability to protect themselves against shareholders siphoning assets out of
the firm. By removing a manager's incentive to undertake this socially
undesirable action, this strategy minimizes the conflict of interest.
Third, allowing management to pursue the interests of creditors in
the zone of insolvency mitigates the impact of shareholder incentives for
underinvestment. Managers will be more likely to undertake transactions
that will only benefit creditors since they will not lose the protection of
the business judgment rule.
The legal response in the U.S. does not adequately address the
divergent liquidation preferences between creditors and shareholders.
This leads to costly valuation litigation as creditors and shareholders
squabble over whether a company should be liquidated or reorganized.
The German legal strategy addresses two of these conflicts of
interest by preventing management from undertaking risky transactions
or siphoning out assets to shareholders. By granting creditors standing to
sue directors for grossly negligent business decisions in the zone of
insolvency, managers will be unlikely to undertake excessively risky
transactions. Likewise, the risk that managers will siphon corporate
assets out to shareholders is eliminated by barring such transactions in
the zone of insolvency. However, Germany's legal response, which
provides little management flexibility, does not minimize the conflicts of
interest created by divergent liquidation preferences and shareholder
incentives for underinvestment. By forcing managers to initiate
insolvency proceedings, shareholders will have little say in whether the
company liquidates or reorganizes. Likewise, by barring most
transactions once a company enters the zone of insolvency, managers
186. See generally Part II supra.
187. Id.
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will be unlikely to undertake investments whose benefits only flow to
creditors.
Although the Japanese legal response does little to address the
conflicts of interest created in the zone of insolvency, corporate practice
in Japan reduces three of these conflicts. The conflicts of interest created
by divergent risk preferences, liquidation preferences, and shareholder
incentives for underinvestment are all reduced by the role of the main
bank and the system of cross-ownership. Once companies become
financially distressed, main banks step in and exert strong influence over
directors. Accordingly, directors will be unlikely to undertake
excessively risky transactions with close bank monitoring. Likewise,
directors will be likely to undertake transactions whose benefits only
flow to creditors because they exert such a strong influence. Since many
creditors are also shareholders, the conflict of interest created by
divergent liquidation preferences is reduced. The reality that corporate
liquidations are rare in Japan's economy further reduces the impact of
liquidation preferences. However, Japanese practice does little to
address each party's race to corporate assets. Rather, as a company
approaches insolvency, main banks and trade creditors, who are also
shareholders, will likely exert control over corporate assets.
In summary, the U.S. legal response and Japanese corporate practice
minimize the conflicts of interest creating agency costs in the zone of
insolvency to a greater extent than the German legal response.
Moreover, directors in the U.S. and Japan have greater flexibility to
reduce these conflicts or prefer one party's interest over the other.
C. Maximizing Firm Value
The policy of maximizing firm value is superior to maximizing
creditor or shareholder value.' 88 Maximizing firm value theoretically
maximizes value for all stakeholders, including creditors and
shareholders. Moreover, it provides management more flexibility to
determine the best strategy for the corporation. Thus, management can
determine whether the best approach in a struggling company is a
workout with creditors, reorganization, or liquidation.
A strategy that maximizes firm value attempts to promote the
welfare of all stakeholders. Because firm value can be maximized
188. For an argument supporting the superiority of maximizing firm value, see Lin,
supra note 2, at 1496-1500 (arguing that value maximization promotes an efficient
allocation of resources and maximizes social welfare); but see Alon Chaver & Jesse M.
Fried, Managers' Fiduciary Duty Upon the Firm's Insolvency: Accounting for
Performance Creditors, 55 VAND. L. REv. 1813, 1825-26 (2002) (arguing that firm value
maximization is problematic because it does not account for performance creditors).
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through either liquidation or operation of the firm as a going concern,
this strategy provides the flexibility to choose the best outcome. In
contrast, a strategy that requires the maximization of firm value to either
shareholders or creditors at the expense of the other could lead to a
socially undesirable outcome. Thus, strategies that allow firm
maximization are preferable to strategies that, as a policy matter, place
one stakeholder's interests above the other's.
The U.S. strategy gives directors the discretion to determine the best
manner in which to operate the firm in the zone of insolvency. Directors
will be insulated from personal liability if they discharge their fiduciary
duties in good faith with the belief that the action taken is in the best
interests of any stakeholder. Accordingly, this gives directors, who have
the best information about the company's financial position, the
flexibility to pursue the course of action most likely to maximize firm
value.
In contrast to the U.S. strategy, the German strategy requires
directors to initiate insolvency proceedings and limits directors' ability to
enter transactions. This strategy maximizes firm value for creditors at
the expense of shareholders and other stakeholders. Initiating insolvency
proceedings immediately protects creditors by preventing the firm from
worsening its financial position. Moreover, director liability to creditors
for undertaking certain transactions reduces directors' willingness to
undertake transactions that could benefit all stakeholders. Like
Germany's overall system of corporate governance, this legal strategy is
much more risk adverse than the U.S. strategy.
Although the Japanese legal strategy promotes maximization of
creditor value, Japanese practice allows stakeholders to pursue a course
of action that maximizes the value of the firm. As Japanese main banks
take the reins of struggling companies, they create incentives to pursue
the course of action that best maximizes firm value and overall social
welfare. This is often achieved through restructuring and merger.
Liquidation, even when socially-optimal, occurs less-frequently as main
banks occasionally collect above-market interest rates from firms in their
corporate groups in exchange for an implicit commitment to support the
firm during periods of financial distress. 189 Thus, Japanese practice in
the zone of insolvency is somewhat inferior to the U.S. legal strategy
because of sub-optimal levels of efficient liquidation.
In summary, both the U.S. legal strategy and Japanese practice are
superior to the German legal strategy by promoting the maximization of
firm value and overall social welfare.
189. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor As
Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 1277, 1297-98 (1991).
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D. Clarity and Predictability
Ideal strategies and practices provide clarity and predictability to
directors, shareholders, and creditors. Directors need to know how to
discharge their fiduciary duties when the corporation enters the zone of
insolvency. Likewise, shareholders and creditors need to know how to
monitor directors and how to enforce breaches of fiduciary duty.
Clarity and predictability are marginal at best under the U.S.
regulatory strategy. Although the Production Resources framework
clearly outlines director duties in the zone of insolvency, to the extent
that courts in other jurisdictions interpret Credit Lyonnais differently, the
status of director duties in the zone of insolvency is unclear. This lack of
clarity is magnified by the reality that director liability will often be
reviewed by bankruptcy courts and district courts that lack the level of
sophistication of the Delaware Court of Chancery with respect to
corporate law. Moreover, this lack of clarity makes it difficult for
directors to predict when they will face claims of personal liability.
Likewise, without a more developed body of case law, creditors and
shareholders do not have clear guidance as to when director action in the
zone of insolvency supports a claim of liability. This is apt to lead
shareholders' lawyers to raise such claims whenever remotely possible
because of the outside shot that one will prevail.
In contrast to the U.S., Germany's statutorily defined duties provide
clarity and predictability to directors, shareholders, and creditors.
Director duties are clearly elucidated in the statutes, giving directors
guidance on how to discharge their duties once a company approaches
the zone of insolvency. Moreover, situations where creditors may bring
claims against directors are also clearly defined.
Japanese practice falls closer to the U.S. in terms of clarity and
predictability. Since litigation by creditors is rare, directors can
generally expect them not to raise such claims. However, such claims
could increase as Japanese capital markets become more open to foreign
investment because foreign creditors do not share the Japanese cultural
distaste for litigation. Moreover, clarity and predictability is diminished
by reality since few legal rules guide the discharge of director duties in
the zone of insolvency, directors must look to main banks to determine
how to operate the company.
In summary, Germany's regulatory strategies in the zone of
insolvency provide greater clarity and predictability than that of the U.S.
and Japan.
VII. Conclusion
In conclusion, each comparative jurisdiction addresses the agency
2007]
PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
cost problem of shareholder opportunism vis-A-vis creditors by providing
additional protections to creditors. The U.S. provides creditor protection
primarily through the use of the standards strategy. Once a corporation
enters the zone of insolvency, standards of ex post director liability
expand to allow directors to consider the interests of creditors and other
stakeholders. Moreover, U.S. law gives creditors standing to enforce
fiduciary duty claims for director actions that led to the company's
insolvency.
Germany provides creditor protection through the use of both legal
rules and standards of director liability. Legal rules trigger specific
director duties and obligations upon certain conditions of financial
distress. Directors face potential liability to creditors if they breach these
duties.
In contrast, Japan's primary mechanism of creditor protection
comes from the powerful role that main banks play in corporate
governance. Although Japan provides creditor protection through legal
rules, such rules are seldom enforced. Rather, the largest creditors of
Japanese corporations protect their interests in the zone of insolvency
through monitoring and the ability to replace management.
Of the three distinct approaches, the U.S. approach best addresses
the agency cost problems present in the zone of insolvency. The U.S.
approach allows managers to minimize conflicts of interest between
shareholders and creditors and provides management the flexibility
needed to pursue the optimal goal of firm maximization.
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